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Executive summary
•  The International Criminal Court (ICC) provides 
the most promising, and potentially only, venue 
for accountability for those most responsible for 
serious post-election violence in Kenya.
•  International scrutiny, specifically the involvement 
of Kofi Annan and diplomatic pressure, sought 
to promote a resolution to violence and gave 
weight to the recommendations of a domestic 
commission of inquiry, but were unable to ensure 
domestic or hybrid accountability proceedings.
•  The ICC is expected by many in Kenya and 
beyond to pursue positive complementarity—
that is, to have a significant impact on domestic 
accountability and the fight against impunity in  
the country.
•  The approval of the investigation into the situation 
in Kenya turned on a determination that crimes 
likely to be tried were not being investigated or 
tried in Kenya, and that they were of sufficient 
gravity to merit ICC scrutiny.
•  It will be difficult to ensure that ICC proceedings 
are accessible to the population, but potential for 
impact of the trials in Kenya depends on this.
•  Both case selection and the approach to  
timing and publicity of arrest warrants are 
sensitive politically.
•  Though the new Kenyan constitution, approved 
in a referendum in August 2010, might help 
prevent political violence in the future, serious and 
sustained efforts will be required to avoid tragic 
scenarios around the 2012 elections and beyond.
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ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POST-ELECTION 
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A BREAKTHROUGH IN JUSTICE? 2
CENTRE ON HUmAN RIGHTS IN CONflICT 2010
Overview
Following contested elections in Kenya in December 
2007, unrest and violence shook the country in January 
and February 2008, prompting diplomatic intervention 
by the international community, most notably by the 
former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. 
A negotiated solution put in place a power-sharing deal 
between the two main parties contesting the presidential 
election: the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and 
the Party of National Unity (PNU). 
As part of the National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
process, the government appointed a Commission of 
Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, known as the Waki 
Commission (after its chair, Justice Philip Waki). A key 
recommendation of the commission’s report was the 
establishment of a Special Tribunal to try those responsible 
for the worst abuses. Two of the three judges and the 
prosecutor of the proposed tribunal would be non-
Kenyan, which would give the tribunal the credibility and 
independence that Kenyan courts lack. The commission 
also compiled a confidential list naming those with 
significant responsibility for the violence (believed to be 
mainly very high-level politicians), which Justice Waki gave 
to Annan in a sealed envelope, to be handed over to the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) should a domestic tribunal not be established. 
The Kenyan parliament failed to approve a bill creating a 
Special Tribunal, and despite the government’s suggestion 
that a reformed local judiciary could hear cases, it took no 
serious steps towards legal reform either—though the new 
constitution contains provisions that should strengthen 
the judiciary’s independence. Following the passage of 
several deadlines set by the ICC prosecutor for Kenya to 
establish such a body, the OTP sought the opening of 
an investigation, which the judges of Pre-Trial Chamber II 
approved on 31 March 2010. 
While the engagement of the ICC with Kenya is in its 
early stages, the time is ripe for an initial assessment 
of its efficacy in promoting accountability in Kenya, 
and implications for future engagements. The authors 
undertook research and interviews in Nairobi, Kenya in 
January 2010 and in The Hague, Netherlands (the seat of 
the ICC) in July 2010 to draw out the views of experts and 
key actors on the ground.1 Debates over accountability for 
post-election violence in Kenya raise a number of critical 
questions, both legal and political.
Can international scrutiny and 
pressure help promote domestic 
accountability processes?
The response to election-related violence in Kenya 
illustrates both the potential for and limits to international 
pressure in promoting accountability for abuses.
International pressure 
International scrutiny of the situation in Kenya was 
sustained and intense, at least during the violence itself 
and in the wake of the report by the Waki Commission. 
The African Union’s appointment of former United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan to lead the mediation efforts 
highlighted the importance of resolving the situation in 
Kenya peacefully. Similarly, Annan was able to wield the 
Waki Commission’s envelope relatively effectively. His 
threats to turn it over to the International Criminal Court 
undoubtedly helped prompt the drafting of legislation 
to create a hybrid tribunal. However, despite several 
attempts, parliament never passed the legislation, and 
the government’s attempts to forestall international 
prosecutions with the promise of domestic reform and 
trials suggest that while top officials were sensitive to 
diplomatic pressure, they also hoped to resist or evade it.
Pressure from foreign aid donors
The many Western countries that provide Kenya with 
foreign aid strongly supported the AU mediation team that 
ended the 2007-08 crisis. This included pressuring both 
sides to reach a negotiated agreement that would restore 
order to the country. Donors also committed themselves 
to supporting the long-term processes that would reform 
Kenyan institutions and practices in order to prevent future 
violence. They considered the implementation of the 
Waki Commission’s recommendations to be a high priority 
and a concrete demonstration that the government 
of national unity was truly committed to seeking 
accountability for past atrocities and preventing election 
violence from recurring.
When the government failed to implement the key 
accountability-related recommendation of the Waki 
Commission, described in the next section, donors shifted 
their attention to the constitutional reform process and the 
re-establishment of institutions, such as the independent 
electoral commission, that helped ensure that the August 
2010 constitutional referendum was free and fair and that 
the 2012 general elections would be so too. By accepting 
the ICC alone would hold perpetrators accountable, 
without any trials in Kenya, donors acquiesced de facto to 
impunity for all but a handful of perpetrators.
1    Professor Sriram would like to thank the Nuffield Foundation for its support to her research for the project through Research Grant SGS/37456. 
Professor Brown would like to gratefully acknowledge funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Domestic inaction
The Waki Commission report highlighted the limitations 
of the Kenyan justice system, noting the endemic 
corruption that causes most Kenyans to mistrust it. 
For this reason, it advocated a hybrid model for the 
Special Tribunal for Kenya (STK), with sufficient numbers 
of international judges and other actors to limit the 
possibility of biased or politicized trials. However, the 
very prospect of independent trials may have doomed 
them, as some of the very parliamentarians and 
ministers whose votes were required for passage of an 
STK bill had reason to fear that institution could be used 
to prosecute them. 
At the same time, the prospects for serious domestic 
trials are very limited, especially for high-level alleged 
perpetrators. To date, only a few low-level prosecutions 
have proceeded and, in part due to poor handling of 
evidence by the police, only one has led to a conviction, 
a case in which the victims were two police officers. 
No high-ranking person has been charged with any 
responsibility, despite the reported availability of a 
significant amount of evidence. This would seem to 
suggest the limits to international pressure for rule of law 
and accountability, particularly in states with entrenched 
patterns of corruption and impunity such as Kenya. 
Can the prospect of 
International Criminal Court 
investigations promote 
accountability? 
Advocates for the ICC, and the prosecutor himself, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, have argued that the shadow of 
the ICC—scrutiny not only by diplomats but also by an 
international prosecutor able to launch investigations 
and prosecution—can compel changes in domestic 
behaviour. They often cite ICC scrutiny of the situation in 
Colombia, and of the Justice and Peace Law there, as 
demonstrating that the ICC can help promote domestic 
criminal accountability or foster rule of law reform. 
Similar arguments have been made with respect to 
Kenya, and indeed the prosecutor’s “three-pronged 
strategy” expressly envisioned domestic proceedings—
the three prongs being trials in The Hague for those 
deemed most responsible, trials in Kenya for one 
hundred or more alleged perpetrators, and a truth 
commission to produce a historical record of abuses 
and promote reconciliation. The impact on the ground, 
however, is questionable. The government never created 
the proposed the Special Tribunal; its promises to 
reform the judiciary and hold domestic trials appear to 
have been designed solely to evade ICC prosecutions; 
the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission that 
was created has been dogged by controversy; and 
as noted above there have been very limited 
domestic proceedings.
However, the ICC may have had some impact on 
the discourse surrounding accountability in Kenya. 
In a country where recommendations of numerous 
commissions of inquiry dealing with corruption and 
serious violations of law have not been implemented, 
the prospect of ICC involvement may have opened up 
political space for civil society to press for accountability. 
Thus many NGOs rallied around the cry of “don’t be 
vague: let’s go to The Hague”. Whether there is a lasting 
legacy remains to be seen. Some civil society activists 
have argued that the prospect of seeing even one senior 
politician face accountability could constitute a very 
important step in ending the culture of impunity that has 
characterized Kenya for so long. 
Nonetheless, the Office of the Prosecutor has been clear 
that while it promotes the concept of complementarity—
the encouragement by that office of domestic 
accountability—it is not a development actor. That is to 
say, the OTP itself will not expressly engage in training 
and technical support for a domestic judiciary. This will 
prove disappointing to those in Kenyan civil society who 
clearly hope that the court will provide such assistance 
not only to the Kenyan judiciary, but also to civil society 
organizations themselves. Nonetheless, other organs 
of the court, including the registry, may undertake more 
direct engagement. Many expect that the activities of 
the ICC’s witness protection and victims units could 
provide a positive model for the Kenyan judiciary.
When should the ICC 
prosecutor pursue the opening 
of investigations? 
The pursuit by the prosecutor of investigations in Kenya 
generates insights into how the prosecutor engages 
recalcitrant states. Similarly, it presents a novel situation: 
in comparison to most of the other situations under 
investigation by the court, it involves a short period 
of political violence rather than a longer-term internal 
armed conflict.
Inability, unwillingness, and delay
The principle of complementarity articulated in the 
Rome Statute—which established the ICC—dictates 
that cases should not proceed unless a state is 
unable or unwilling to genuinely pursue investigations 
or prosecutions. Because the Kenya situation is the 
first one in which the prosecutor sought to open an 
investigation of his own volition (proprio motu), rather 
than via state or United Nations Security Council referral, 
the complementarity threshold was particularly salient 
at an early stage. This was made more complicated 
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by the fact that at least notionally, the government put 
forward various forms of domestic accountability, albeit 
in apparent efforts to delay or halt ICC involvement 
altogether.
The ICC prosecutor engaged extensively with the 
Kenyan government, pushing first for the STK 
envisioned in the Waki report, and then for the three-
pronged strategy. He sought to elicit a referral directly 
from the Kenyan government. However, when this 
was not forthcoming, following about one year of 
discussions and delays, he requested the opening 
of the investigation himself. This suggests that while 
states may have some leeway for evasion, it is limited. 
Similarly, the pre-trial chamber judges, in approving the 
opening of the investigation, did not consider there to 
be any relevant prosecutions in Kenya, by which was 
meant that the persons likely to be prosecuted before 
the court were not the same individuals as the few who 
had been or are being tried in Kenya.
Gravity of crimes
The threshold of gravity dictates that cases should not 
be pursued if they are not of sufficient gravity. However, 
precisely what this means has not always been clear: 
as the prosecutor himself has noted, all of the crimes 
enumerated in the statute are by definition grave. There 
can be no question that the crimes committed in Kenya 
were very serious. However, in comparison to the sheer 
scale and protracted nature of abuses in, for example, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the abuses might 
seem relatively small. 
In an earlier decision not to pursue investigations into 
abuses committed by British soldiers in Iraq, the Office 
of the Prosecutor seemed to suggest that gravity was 
determined by numbers. If this were the case, then 
perhaps Kenya, with some 1300 deaths (a relatively 
low number of deaths compared to other situations), 
should not have been the subject of ICC investigations. 
However, using the broader criteria now promoted by 
the OTP, which include not just scale but also manner 
of commission, the nature of the crimes, and their effect 
on victims, the pre-trial chamber judges determined 
that crimes committed in Kenya were sufficiently grave. 
Nonetheless, among some observers, questions remain, 
and the issue of gravity may arise again when individual 
cases are pursued. 
How can involvement by the 
International Criminal Court be 
made relevant to the victims 
and affected population?
International tribunals regularly face the criticism that 
they are too distant to have any genuine impact on 
societies riven by violence or war, and that they seldom 
have much relevance for specific victims. This criticism 
has engendered two innovations in international criminal 
accountability: the establishment of hybrid tribunals and 
outreach sections. Hybrid tribunals, generally including 
national and international staff and held on the territory 
of the affected country, are somewhat more accessible 
than those based in foreign countries. However, the STK 
seems unlikely to be created. 
Thus the outreach section is potentially yet more 
important. In general, the role of outreach offices is 
to provide information about what a court’s mandate 
is, what it can and will do, and equally importantly, 
what it cannot do. Indeed, at the review conference 
of the Rome Statute held in May-June 2010, states 
parties and experts lauded outreach as essential to 
the work of the court. Yet, while outreach is required to 
convey the work of the court to affected populations, 
the efforts of outreach offices are often undermined 
by the inaccessibility, because of poor infrastructure 
or violence, of remote and often violence-affected 
populations. Low levels of literacy limit the impact of 
printed information, and limited electricity in many 
conflict-affected countries may make dissemination by 
radio, television, or the internet difficult as well. All of 
these challenges are present in Kenya, and made more 
difficult by the size of the country. 
The ICC’s outreach office has sought to engage with 
Kenyan civil society from the beginning, initiating visits 
alongside the office within the registry tasked with 
enabling victim participation as the prosecutor sought 
the opening of an investigation in late 2009. The 
presence of outreach activities from the earliest stages 
is a first for the ICC, or for any international criminal 
tribunal, and is a positive development. 
Nonetheless, its impact for the moment will be limited. 
There is currently no actual outreach office in Kenya, 
and security and budgetary concerns mean that an 
office might not be opened in the future. At the moment, 
it is the outreach office in Kampala, Uganda, officially 
tasked with work on the situation in northern Uganda, 
which is engaged with Kenya. Its work is hampered 
by distance, and by very limited funds. Some NGO 
officials have argued for holding trials, or at least some 
proceedings, in Kenya, to increase accessibility, but the 
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prospects of this are limited, given the security concerns 
that have thus far prevented even the opening of a 
standing outreach office.
Which cases to select? How 
to pursue indictments and 
arrests?
Case and perpetrator selection
The selection of incidents to be examined and individual 
perpetrators to be investigated is politically sensitive. 
Should the prosecutor appear to focus unduly on only 
one group of perpetrators, or on incidents affecting 
victims from only one community, he could be accused 
of bias, undermining the legitimacy of the court. Thus 
the prosecutor has indicated that he intends to pursue 
two Kenyan cases, with two or three accused believed 
to bear significant responsibility from one political “side” 
in each case, to ensure balance. However, this may not 
suffice to ensure legitimacy, particularly as, according 
to the Waki report, the police caused more than one 
third of the 1,133 documented deaths during the post-
election violence, and it is not clear that any high-level 
police officials will be targeted through this approach. 
Further, while efforts to pursue balanced indictments 
may address political and stability concerns, they may 
undermine broader claims that the prosecutor is simply 
following the evidence and is not swayed by political 
concerns.
Indictments and arrests
Regardless of the composition of the cases and 
perpetrators, the issuance of indictments will also be 
politically sensitive. The widespread assumption in 
Kenya is that senior politicians from both ODM and 
PNU will be indicted. Given their positions in the current 
government and ethnoregional power bases, this could 
well be destabilizing, and further inflame the debate 
ignited by the indictment of Sudanese President Omar 
al-Bashir regarding the prosecution of heads of state, 
notwithstanding the fact that it is clearly within the 
court’s mandate to do just that. 
Observers are split as to whether indictments should 
be sealed and arrest warrants kept secret, which would 
potentially enable surprise arrests, or should be public, 
which might topple some accused from power or at 
least prevent them from standing for office in the 2012 
general elections. Many are sceptical, regardless, of 
the willingness of the government generally, or the 
police specifically, to arrest those likely to be accused. 
Concerns range from the risk of destabilization to 
delegitimization of the ICC should arrests not take place. 
One possible alternative is the issuance of a summons 
to appear, rather than an arrest warrant. In such a 
circumstance, the accused would present themselves 
voluntarily before the court to face charges, but remain 
free, and able to return to Kenya prior to any conviction. 
This device has been used to secure the appearance 
of three rebel leaders from Darfur, a point which the 
prosecutor has made when in Kenya. This could, 
according to some, be a useful face-saving device. 
Current prospects
In an August 2010 referendum, voters endorsed a 
new Kenyan constitution that contains many provisions 
that could help relieve grievances and potentially 
reduce the probability of future electoral violence. 
For instance, it reduces the concentration of power in 
the presidency and adds new checks and balances. 
This lessens the incentives for holding the presidency. 
The new constitution also includes measures to render 
the judiciary more independent and promises to redress 
historic injustices, especially with regards to land 
ownership, which could defuse some tensions. 
One must not, however, place too much hope in the 
new constitution’s capacity to prevent violence. Any 
form of change or redress creates winners and losers—
and the latter may use violence in protest. Also, the 
application of constitutional provisions depends on 
the rule of law, which is currently very deficient in 
Kenya and unlike to change overnight, be it because 
of the promulgation of a new constitution or trials in 
The Hague. 
Most of the political violence in Kenya since the early 
1990s has been sponsored by senior officials, who 
usually pay local militias to carry out attack. Such 
actors continue to operate unimpeded and no efforts 
have been made to date to disband or disarm them or 
prosecute any of their members. Even if the ICC does 
imprison a handful of top-level perpetrators, actors 
at lower levels will continue to operate with complete 
impunity. They may conclude that in order to avoid 
accountability in the future, they need only make sure 
that they cannot be shown to be among the small 
number of people who bear the greatest responsibility 
for atrocities. Violence could well recur during the 2012 
elections and beyond.
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findings and recommendations
•  International diplomatic and donor scrutiny and 
pressure can encourage recalcitrant states to address 
serious violations and abuses, but only up to a point: 
it remains difficult to convince politicians who might 
themselves be implicated to authorize prosecutions.
•  The ICC can help catalyze domestic advocates of 
justice and may encourage some behaviour change 
in domestic politicians, but cannot compel domestic 
accountability measures.
•  The prosecutor of the ICC will likely seek to encourage 
states to self-refer cases or take domestic measures, 
but will not permit indefinite delay and avoidance 
tactics by them. Where seeking to pursue the opening 
of an investigation proprio motu, the prosecutor will 
need to provide detailed evidence regarding the 
gravity of the alleged crimes and presence of domestic 
proceedings.
•  The limited budget for outreach and the absence of 
an outreach office in-country will limit the effects of the 
proceedings for victims and the affected population. 
The ICC should consider setting up an office in Kenya 
at the earliest opportunity. It could also consider 
holding some trials or proceedings in-country, 
although security concerns, both for witnesses and 
the proceedings themselves, may dictate against 
doing so. The model of having the outreach office 
engage a country at the earliest stages of ICC scrutiny 
should be followed in future situations. Countries 
that finance the ICC’s operations should ensure that 
sufficient resources are available for such activities.
•  In choosing which situations to investigate and which 
individuals to pursue, political concerns have dictated 
that the prosecutor take a ‘balanced’ approach. 
However, the prosecutor should take care to avoid 
unintentional exclusion of other perpetrators (e.g., 
high-level police officials), or the appearance that 
political concerns supersede ordinary prosecutorial 
concerns.
•  There are arguments in favour of and against issuance 
of public arrest warrants against senior officials. A third 
option is the summons to appear, which has been 
used, albeit not frequently.
•  Though ICC trials and the adoption of a new 
constitution may help deter some political violence, 
there remains a significant risk that new atrocities 
could take place, notably in relation to the 2012 
elections. The Kenyan government and its international 
partners should carefully monitor tensions and 
potential incitement across the country, especially 
in areas that have been “hot spots” in the past. The 
Kenyan government also should take additional steps 
to disarm militias. 
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About the CHRC:
The Centre on Human Rights in Conflict (CHRC) is 
an interdisciplinary centre promoting policy-relevant 
research and events aimed at developing greater 
knowledge about the relationship between human 
rights and conflict. Our work in human rights and armed 
conflict addresses the complex interplay between 
human rights and armed conflict, including human 
rights violations as both cause and consequence of 
violent conflict, the dilemma of pursuing justice as 
well as peacebuilding, and the unique challenges for 
the protection of human rights posed by illegal armed 
groups and terrorist organizations. Specific research and 
events have been developed in three areas: Rule of Law 
in Post-Conflict Situations, Business and Human Rights 
in Conflict, and Accountability, Reconciliation and DDR 
in Post-Conflict Situations. Further information can be 
found at www.uel.ac.uk/chrc.
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